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Abstract 
 
In this study we build a simultaneous equation model in which the measures of different aspects of 
globalization (attributable to KOF) and different aspects of democracy (attributable to EIU) are 
related in seven structural equations. A bi-directional relationship between democracy and 
globalization is visualized. The model is estimated by the conventional 2-SLS as well as a modified 2-
SLS in which Shapley value regression is used at the second stage of 2-SLS. On the basis of our 
analysis we conclude the following: (1). Overall, democracy and globalization promote each other 
and hence there is a bi-directional causality with positive relationships running both ways between 
democracy and globalization. At a national level, there may be various intermediary conditions that 
modify the relationship as well as set in motion a complex of positive and/or negative feedbacks to 
accelerate or retard the pace of globalization and democratization in a country-specific manner. 
However, when a large number of countries are studied a clear relationship emerges out. (2). There 
is a need to estimate the structural coefficients of the model cautiously since the regression 
equations may be suffering from collinearity among the predictor variables. The Shapley value 
regression based 2-SLS has performed better than the conventional regression in estimating the 
structural parameters of the model.  (3). It is expected that the system methods of estimation of the 
model would give better results than what are obtained by the single equation methods of 
estimation of structural parameters of the model.   
 
Key words: Simultaneous equations model, Two-Stage Least Squares, Instrumental Variables, 
Collinearity, Shapley Value Regression, Democracy Index, Globalization Index. 
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1. Introduction: The bearing of regime type (that has democracy and authoritarianism at two 
opposite poles) on globalization are debatable. On the one hand, there are research findings and 
arguments that suggest a positive influence of democratic attributes in governance on globalization, 
while, on the other hand, there are empirical studies as well as consorted line of reasoning that 
favours authoritarian elements in governance to promoting globalization.  Reversing the arrow of 
causality, some scholars have given the logic along with empirical evidences that globalization 
promotes democracy while some others have reasons to contend that globalization hurts 
democracy.  Since a political regime has more pervasive, direct and explicit effects, the issue of 
impacts of globalization on democracy has elicited more attention of the scholars.   
 
Economists such as Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) argued that free trade and 
capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation lead to economic development 
which fosters demands for democracy. Schwartzman (1998) identified class conflict as the social 
mechanism linking world-system processes to national political dynamics. In this framework, 
domestic political structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of economic relations. 
Consequently, globalization promotes democracy at the national level which in turn facilitates 
further globalization in the interest of the dominant world economic system. 
 
Li and Reuveny (2003) studied 127 countries for 26 years (1970-1996) and found that different 
constituents of globalization affect democracy in different manner not conformal to each other. In 
their own words: “Trade openness and portfolio investment inflows negatively affect democracy. 
The effect of trade openness is constant over time while the negative effect of portfolio investment 
inflows strengthens. FDI inflows positively affect democracy, but the effect weakens over time. The 
spread of democratic ideas promotes democracy persistently over time.”  
 
Sobhan (2003) argued that the process of globalization represents involuntary and often extraneous 
constraints on the government and the people of a country. Countries with weak democratic 
institutions and undiversified or externally dependent economies fall prey to the globalization 
forces. Globalization may favourably help the economies that can diversify and where political 
institutions are strong enough to protect the interests of the citizens of different sections.  
 
Rudra (2005) covered 59 developing countries for the time period 1972-97 and found that 
globalization did not directly and unconditionally promote democracy. Increasing exposure to 
international export and financial markets did lead to improvements in democracy only if safety nets 
were used simultaneously as a strategy for providing stability and building political support.   
 
In their study that analyses a long series of historical data (1870-2000) for a large number of 
countries, Eichengreen and Lebang (2006) found a bidirectional causality suggesting the existence of 
positive relationships running both ways between democracy and globalization. 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) showed that the relationship between development and political 
regime is not a direct one. The political regime type shapes and is also shaped by economic conflict 
between elites and citizens. Political elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high 
degree of political competition or when they are highly entrenched. Expected political replacement 
effect has a direct bearing on the involvement of the elite class in a country in facilitating or 
discouraging globalization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b) also observed that key democratizing 
forces associated with trade openness depend on country’s relative factor endowment. 
 
Milner and Mukherjee (2009) studied 130 developing countries in the period 1975-2002 distributed 
over different continents. It was found that democracy fostered trade and capital account 
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liberalization, while the effect of economic openness on democracy was positive but weak. Neither 
trade nor capital account liberalization had any statistically significant effects on democratization.  
 
Turyahikayo (2014) examined the impact of globalization on domestic political structures and 
processes in established, transitional and non-democratic regimes. It revealed that globalization has 
been used as a tool by the established democracies with strong economies to exploit transitional 
governments and non-democracies through expanding the range of exploitative investment to bring 
poorer countries in the ambit of influence. Such an expansion feeds on cheap labour. The 
destination countries of such investment also work as dumping ground for the industrial waste.   
 
Steiner (2015) studied macro-level dataset on legislative elections in 23 established democracies 
over the period 1965-2006 to test the hypothesis that higher levels of economic globalization result 
in lower turnout (for voting). The results of the study emphatically indicated that economic 
globalization has negative effects on electoral turnout in established democracies on account of 
reduced party polarization (low dispersion) with limited option with regard to economic policy that 
also induces citizens to think of contesting parties as having less influence on the economy. In view 
of this, globalization may have a negative effect on public participation in the political domain.   
 
Nayyar (2015) observed that the relationship between democracy and globalization is dialectical 
rather than linear or unidirectional. The causation runs in both directions in different spheres whose 
interaction shapes the outcome. 
 
Stein (2016) investigated into the question whether a sovereign state system, democratic 
governments, and an integrated global marketplace can coexist. It assessed analytic materialist 
arguments for their incompatibility and the key assumptions on which they rest. It “describes the 
extant pressures operating to limit each of the three: how sovereignty and democracy work to 
constrain globalization, how globalization and sovereignty generate a democratic deficit, and how 
globalization and democracy lead to limitations upon, and even the transcendence of, sovereignty.”  
 
Haffoudhi and Bellakhal (2016) found that the impact of globalization on democracy is demographic-
regime specific. Countries that overlooked Malthusian constraints fostered democracy, whereas 
countries with late demographic transitions, suffering yet of Malthusian constraints, famines and 
chronic under-nutrition or failed to  invest in human capital and consequently have had inefficient 
resource allocation, also failed to promote democracy.   
 
Kollias and Paleologou (2016) studied the relationship between KOF globalization indices and Polity 
measures of democracy in 110 countries of different income levels (high, medium and low) for the 
period 1970-2011 and found a positive impact of globalization on democracy, but this was not a 
universal finding across all income groups since any effect exerted by globalization on democracy 
may differ depending on a country’s attributes.   
 
By means of canonical correlation analysis, Mishra (2017b) studied the relationship between the 
KOF’s aspect-wise indices of globalization and the Economist Intelligence Unit measures of the 
different constituents of the democracy index for 116 countries distributed over six continents and 
found that indices of democracy and globalization are highly correlated. The study did not 
investigate into the causal arrow of the relationship.  
 
This brief review of research suggests that the relationship between globalization and democracy 
may not be direct. It is mediated by the country-specific institutions, class interests, resource 
endowments, institutional structure, demographic characteristics, involvement and effectiveness of 
the national government in proper management of the economy and the polity and so on. 
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Depending on mediating forces globalization and democratization may have mutually reinforcing or 
mutually conflicting relationship.  
 
2. The Present Study: The investigation at hand acknowledges bi-directional causality between 
globalization and democracy (or the political regime that has full democracy at the one end and 
authoritarianism at the other). It holds that the regime type affects the extent of globalization and 
also that globalization affects the regime type tending to favour democratization.      
 
To capture the bi-directional causality mentioned above, this study constructs a simultaneous 
equation model in which five measures (detailed out below) of different aspects of a regime, ranging 
between the two poles of full democracy and authoritarianism, aim at explaining six indicators of 
globalization (detailed out below). Additionally, some of the indicators of globalization influence the 
overall index of democracy. The globalization indicators as well as the overall index of democracy 
are, thus, the endogenous variables in the model while the indicators of political regime are 
predetermined (exogenous) variables.  
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a British business within the Economist Group has published 
the Democracy Index for 2006, 2008 and 2011 and for every year afterwards up to 2016. The index is 
based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories or dimensions of regime ranging from 
democracy to authoritarianism. These categories are:  Electoral process and pluralism (EPP), 
Functioning of government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture (PCL) and Civil 
liberties (CVL), each one measured by an index. These five measures are used as the predetermined 
(exogenous) variables in the model.  In the present work we have used EPP06, FOG06, PPN06, PCL06 
and CVL06 for the year 2006, pertaining to 116 countries (Mishra, 2017b). 
 
The five measures of different aspects of democracy (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL) mentioned above 
pertaining to any particular year may be suitably weighted and aggregated to yield an overall index 
(DI, or the Index of Democracy with the score value in the range of zero to ten). On the basis of the 
score value (DI) the political systems of different countries may be classified into Full democracies 
(score value in 8-10 range), Flawed democracies (score value in 6 to below-8 range), Hybrid regimes 
(score value in 4 to below-6 range) and authoritarian regimes (score value below 4). This overall 
index of democracy for the year 2016 (DIi16 i=1,2,..., 116 pertaining to 116 countries) is one of the 
endogenous variables in the model. We have used EPPi06, FOGi06, PPNi06, PCLi06 and CVLi06; i=1 
through 116. It may be noted for clarity that DI for 2006 (i.e. DI06) is neither an endogenous nor a 
predetermined variable in the model. 
 
As to the measures of different aspects of globalization, we have used the KOF indices for the period 
2006-2014 (KOF, 2017). The indices of globalization are six in number. They are:  (1). E1 - actual 
economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, (2). E2 - 
relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, 
tariff, etc., (3) S1 - trans-border personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal 
interactions, etc., (4) S2 - flow of information, (5) S3 - cultural proximity, and (6) P - the measure of 
trans-national political set up. All the six (E1 through P), by a scheme of linear combination, are used 
to arrive at the overall composite index of globalization (say, Γ) as described in Dreher (2006) and 
Dreher et al. (2008). Mishra (2017a) uses Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution (AEMC) principle for 
making a linear combination of globalization aspect indicators E through P. The composite index of 
globalization based on AEMC principle may be denoted by G. 
 
For any particular 
thi country (among 116 countries considered in the study at hand) we have G for 9 
years, 2006-2014 that we denote by Gij ; j=2006 through 2014 and i=1 through 116. For every Gij we 
have the associated sub-indices [E1ij, E2ij, S1ij, S2ij, S3ij and Pij ; j=2006 through 2014 and i=1 through 
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116).   From this dataset we have constructed two vectors: ],3;2,1,2,1[ minminminminminmin iiiiii PSSSEE
associated with 116,...,2,1);;(min ]2014,2006[min == ∈ iGG jijji that gives us the set of values associated 
with the lowest extent of globalization experienced by any country during 2006-2014, and similarly, 
],3;2,1,2,1[ maxmaxmaxmaxmaxmax iiiiii PSSSEE  associated with );;(max ]2014,2006[max ∈= jijji GG =i  
1,2,...,116 that gives us the set of values associated with the highest extent of globalization 
experienced by any country during 2006-2014  (Mishra, 2017b).  We may call them pessimistic 
(associated with 
minG ) and optimistic (associated with maxG ) vectors of globalization. We have 
these two vectors as our endogenous variables for estimating the model for pessimistic effects of 
the indicators of the political regime and optimistic effects of the indicators of the political regime.  
 
Our simultaneous equation model is given in the schematic form as under (t denoting pessimistic or 
optimistic vector as the case may be): 
 
1. E1t = f(E2t, S1t,  FOG06, PCL06, CVL06) 
2. E2t = f(S2t,S3t,Pt,EPP06,PPN06)  
3. S1t = f(E1t,S3t,FOG06,PCL06,CVL06)   
4. S2t = f(E2t,FOG06,PCN06,PCL06,CVL06)  
5. S3t = f(Pt,EPP06,FOG06,PPN06,PCL06)  
6. Pt = f(E1t,E2t,S1t,S2t,S3t)  
7. DI16 = f(E2t,S1t,S2t,S3t,Pt)  
 
3. Estimation of the Model: There are several methods to estimate a simultaneous equation model 
that may be primarily classified into two groups: (1) single equation methods, and (2) system 
methods. The single equation methods are easy to apply and free from the undesirable effects of 
misspecification of other equations in the model, but they are susceptible to the detrimental effects 
of disturbances correlated across the equations. The system methods are cumbersome and 
susceptible to the problems of misspecification of equations in the model, but they perform well 
even if the disturbances across the equations are correlated. Between the single equation and the 
system methods of estimation, thus, there is a trade-off between deleterious effects of 
‘misspecification’ and ‘correlated residuals across the equations’ in the model. Since little is known 
about correct specification of different equations in our model, we have favoured the single 
equation method of estimation for ease in computation as well as for avoiding the possible risk in 
proceeding to the system method of estimation under the circumstances of misspecification.  We 
also do not have reasons to assume the disturbances in the equations to be normally distributed. 
Under these circumstances we have chosen the Two-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS) method of 
estimation since it handles instrumental variables in a very natural manner. 
 
The Two-Stage Least Squares for structural Equations: If an econometric model is specified as 
YA+XB+U=0 (where Y are current endogenous and X are predetermined variables),  the 2-SLS 
method first obtain the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) based expected values  of Y by the relationship 
XPY =ˆ  (called the reduced form) and in order to proceed to the second stage substitute the 
estimated yˆ for observed y in the equation wherever it is a regressor variable (and not the 
regressand variable). Thus, among the regressor variables yˆ would be used as an instrumental 
variable (Reiersøl, 1945) representing y, while x is its own instrument. This approach renders the use 
of OLS at the second stage free from the stochastic regressor problem (Mishra, 2017c).  
 
Possible Collinearity among Regressors at the 2nd Stage and its Treatment: However, since at the 
second stage, the 2-SLS uses the estimated values of some endogenous variables together with 
some predetermined variables as regressors, collinearity among the regressor variables may arise. 
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This is because the estimated values of endogenous variables are the linear functions of the 
predetermined variables in the model. Collinearity may affect standard errors of the estimated 
parameters. Signs of the estimated parameters also be wrong (Smith  and Brainard, 1976). Shapley 
value regression  (Lipovetsky, 2006; Mishra, 2016) significantly ameliorates the deleterious effects of 
collinearity on the estimated parameters. In view of this, we have also used the Shapley value 
regression at the second stage of 2-SLS and compared the results of this choice with the 
conventional method that uses OLS at the second stage (Mishra, 2017c) . 
 
4. Empirical Findings: As pointed out earlier, we have used two alternative vectors of globalization 
measures, the one related to G
min
 and the other related to G
max
. Therefore, we have two parallel 
findings, the one for a pessimistic view and the other for an optimistic view of globalization.  
 
The reduced form coefficients (based on OLS) are given in Table-1.1 and Table-1.2 for pessimistic 
and optimistic views of globalization, respectively.  
 
Table-1.1. Estimated  Reduced Form Coefficients Matrix [Transposed P] for Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization  
Eqn 
No. 
Regressand 
Variable 
Reduced Form Coefficients of Predictor Variables (All Predetermined) Relating to Political Regime 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 E1 -0.09669 0.24146 0.24643 0.18092 0.08821 23.34796 
2 E2 0.09687 0.28829 -0.00578 0.20171 0.00678 23.07078 
3 S1 -0.14461 0.08996 0.21068 0.53211 0.30117 -12.02201 
4 S2 -0.04587 0.05542 0.20342 0.31348 0.22407 21.23889 
5 S3 -0.01793 0.42558 0.21272 0.55329 0.07899 -33.44582 
6 P 0.00492 0.00730 0.19940 0.15338 0.09913 46.08075 
7 DI 0.07114 0.20676 0.09848 0.23259 0.32429 3.07933 
. 
Table-1.2. Estimated  Reduced Form Coefficients Matrix [Transposed P] for Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
Eqn 
No. 
Regressand 
Variable 
Reduced Form Coefficients of Predictor Variables (All Predetermined) Relating to Political Regime 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 E1 0.12400 0.10555 0.07432 0.20298 -0.06958 42.89204 
2 E2 0.09679 0.23024 -0.02864 0.24574 0.05692 26.76866 
3 S1 -0.16699 0.12057 0.22784 0.48374 0.30252 -8.67294 
4 S2 -0.07373 0.08948 0.19270 0.30243 0.20114 25.23083 
5 S3 -0.06626 0.45089 0.36109 0.43824 0.11419 -30.03597 
6 P 0.06859 0.01120 0.17536 0.21128 -0.04321 52.97000 
7 DI 0.07114 0.20676 0.09848 0.23259 0.32429 3.07933 
 
 
Table-2.1. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Conventional 2-SLS Estimation (Pessimistic Scenario) 
Eqn 
No. 
Endogenous Variables: Transposed A Matrix Predetermined Variables: Transposed B Matrix 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 -1.0000 0.7800 1.1911 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0906 0.0000 -0.6102 -0.2758 19.6726 
2 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 1.4254 0.5535 -3.5945 0.0000 0.1899 0.0000 0.3033 0.0000 0.0000 176.9464 
3 1.6709 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 -0.9453 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0888 0.0000 0.7528 0.2284 -82.6508 
4 0.0000 -0.4735 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1919 0.2007 0.4090 0.2273 32.1631 
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 0.7969 0.0000 -0.0219 0.4198 0.0538 0.4311 0.0000 -70.1672 
6 -0.2108 -0.6582 -0.8957 1.5482 0.5704 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 41.6162 
7 0.0000 0.2382 -2.3633 6.0177 0.0960 -3.2436 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -5.9572 
 
At the second stage, we have estimated the structural parameters (A and B) by OLS (i.e. 
conventional 2-SLS) and presented them in Table-2.1 (pessimistic view) and Table-2.2 (optimistic 
view). As the proposed alternative at the second stage, we have also estimated the structural 
parameters by Shapley value regression and presented them in Table-3.1 (pessimistic view) and 
Table-3.2 (optimistic view). It may be noted that obtaining the coefficients of the Shapley value 
regression we have to use an efficient optimization method (Lipovetsky, 2006; Mishra, 2016). In the 
present study, this has been done by the Host-Parasite Co-Evolutionary algorithm, which is a 
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powerful biologically inspired population method of global optimization (Mishra, 2013). In Table- 
2.1, Table-2.2, Table-3.1 and Table-3.2, the current endogenous parameters matrix (A) has in the 
principal diagonal cells minus unity which pertains to the dependent endogenous variable in the 
equation concerned. A zero in an off-diagonal cell denotes that the endogenous variable has not 
been included in the particular equation. Similarly, in B matrix, a zero in a cell denotes that the 
particular predetermined variable has not been included in the equation concerned.  
. 
Table-2.2. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Conventional 2-SLS Estimation (Optimistic Scenario) 
Eqn 
No. 
Endogenous Variables: Transposed A Matrix Predetermined Variables: Transposed B Matrix 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 -1.0000 2.3547 0.6222 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5116 0.0000 -0.6766 -0.3918 -14.7428 
2 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.5052 0.0923 0.0000 0.1251 0.0000 -0.2303 0.0000 0.0000 36.6456 
3 -0.9095 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.8182 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1523 0.0000 0.3098 0.1458 54.9108 
4 0.0000 -0.7618 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2649 0.1709 0.4896 0.2445 45.6232 
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 -2.6429 0.0000 0.1150 0.4805 0.8245 0.9966 0.0000 109.9563 
6 1.2483 -0.6065 -0.0036 0.4164 -0.0394 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.9434 
7 0.0000 0.8967 -2.2264 4.6889 -0.3119 -0.9095 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -119.7295 
. 
Table-3.1. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Shapley-Value Regression 2-SLS Estimation (Pessimistic Scenario) 
Eqn 
No. 
Endogenous Variables: Transposed A Matrix Predetermined Variables: Transposed B Matrix 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 -1.0000 0.2246 0.1801 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1058 0.0000 0.1413 0.0857 -41.2332 
2 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.1921 0.1235 0.2956 0.0000 0.0669 0.0000 0.1025 0.0000 0.0000 -47.4994 
3 0.3173 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.1711 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1374 0.0000 0.2075 0.1146 -52.7262 
4 0.0000 0.2622 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1158 0.1397 0.1682 0.1077 -45.3551 
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 0.6622 0.0000 0.1198 0.2281 0.2233 0.2903 0.0000 -95.9363 
6 0.1334 0.1300 0.0993 0.1444 0.0706 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -31.8045 
7 0.0000 0.3241 0.2197 0.2931 0.1585 0.4340 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -84.8041 
. 
Table-3.2. Estimated Structural Parameters Based on Shapley-Value Regression 2-SLS Estimation (Optimistic Scenario) 
Eqn 
No. 
Endogenous Variables: Transposed A Matrix Predetermined Variables: Transposed B Matrix 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL CONST 
1 -1.0000 0.1783 0.1106 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0740 0.0000 0.0929 0.0614 -30.2465 
2 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.2071 0.1157 0.3142 0.0000 0.0693 0.0000 0.1051 0.0000 0.0000 -51.7940 
3 0.4186 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.1708 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1327 0.0000 0.2071 0.1117 -62.6993 
4 0.0000 0.2502 0.0000 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1087 0.1289 0.1635 0.0969 -44.1332 
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.0000 0.7641 0.0000 0.1297 0.2512 0.2468 0.2919 0.0000 -109.4473 
6 0.1968 0.1237 0.0862 0.1179 0.0599 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -35.4534 
7 0.0000 0.3319 0.2273 0.3195 0.1487 0.4421 -1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -92.4873 
. 
Table-4.1. R-Square Values for different equations at different stages of 2-SLS (Pessimistic Scenario) 
Stage Estimation EQN-1 EQN-2 EQN-3 EQN-4 EQN-5 EQN-6 EQN-7 
First Reduced form 0.37531 0.51843 0.52306 0.51708 0.48381 0.25075 0.89822 
Second Conventional 2-SLS 0.37531 0.51843 0.52306 0.51708 0.48381 0.25075 0.89822 
Second Shapley Value 2-SLS 0.36175 0.48034 0.50404 0.50584 0.46533 0.23918 0.84799 
.  
Table-4.2. R-Square Values for different equations at different stages of 2-SLS (Optimistic Scenario) 
Stage Estimation EQN-1 EQN-2 EQN-3 EQN-4 EQN-5 EQN-6 EQN-7 
First Reduced form 0.24173 0.51836 0.51797 0.50351 0.48426 0.28982 0.89822 
Second Conventional 2-SLS 0.24173 0.51836 0.51797 0.50351 0.48426 0.28982 0.89822 
Second Shapley Value 2-SLS 0.22952 0.48162 0.49500 0.49216 0.47196 0.27350 0.83577 
 
In Table-4.1 and Table-4.2 we have presented the R
2
 obtained for different equations for pessimistic 
and optimistic views of globalization, respectively. It is seen that conventional 2-SLS at the second 
stage gives the R
2
 values that are identical to those obtained for the reduced form equations. 
However, the R
2
 values for the proposed 2-SLS (in which OLS is replaced by the Shapley value 
regression) are a little smaller than those given by the conventional 2-SLS based on OLS. This cost 
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has to be paid for treating the collinearity problem that has devastating effects on the coefficients of 
the structural equations.   
 
Table-5. Predictor Variables that obtain Negatively Signed Structural Coefficients Estimated by the Conventional 2-SLS 
Eqn. 
No. 
Endogenous 
(Dependent) 
Variable 
Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
Predictor Variables Predictor Variables 
Endogenous Predetermined Endogenous Predetermined 
1 E1 - FOG, PCl, CVL - FOG, PCl, CVL 
2 E2 P - - PPN 
3 S1 S3 - E1 FOG 
4 S2 E2 - E2 - 
5 S3 - EPP P - 
6 P E1, E2, S1 - E2, S1, S3 - 
7 DI16 S1, P - S1, S3, P - 
 
In Table-5 we present the list of predictor variables (equation-wise) that have negatively signed 
structural coefficients estimated by the conventional 2-SLS.  In the first equation (for E1) the 
democracy measures FOG (Functioning of Government), PCL (political Culture) and CVL (Civil 
Liberties) have negative sign. This is for both pessimistic and optimistic views of globalization. In the 
second equation P (political measure of globalization) or PPN (Political Participation) adversely affect 
E2 (relaxation of constraints on trans-border flow of goods, services and finance). In equation #3 
trans-border personal contacts (S1) are adversely affected by cultural proximity (S3), trans-border 
flow of goods, services and finance (E1) or the Functioning of the Government (FOG). In equation #4, 
follow of information (S2) is adversely affected by relaxation of restrictions on trans-border trade 
and flow of finance (E2). In equation #4, cultural proximity (S3) is adversely affected by electoral 
process and pluralism (EPP) or political set up for enhancing globalization (P). In equation #6, the 
political set up for enhancing globalization is adversely affected by trans-border flow of goods, 
services and finance (E1), relaxation for restrictions on trans-border trade etc. (E2), trans-border 
personal contacts and movement of people (S1) or trans-border cultural proximity (S3). It may be 
noted that most of these (negative) relationships are unexpected and misleading.   They also 
indicate that different measures of globalization are not in concordance with each other. As to the 
final equation (#7 for DI16), trans-border personal contacts and movement of people (S1), political 
set up for promoting globalization (P) and/or cultural proximity (S3) adversely affect 
democratization.   
 
In contrast, a perusal of Table-3.1 and Table-3.2 (the structural coefficient matrices A’ and B’ 
obtained by the proposed Shapley value regression at the second stage) suggests that the 
coefficients associated with endogenous as well as predetermined variables (off-diagonal elements 
of A’ and the elements B’ - except the constant term) are all positive. They suggest that globalization 
measures are concordant with each other and the democratic regimes promote globalization. These 
results are in consonance with the research findings elsewhere (Mishra, 2017b). We also find that 
DI16 is positively affected by all predictor variables included in equation #7, indicating that 
globalization promotes democratization.  
 
The contrasting results obtained by the conventional 2-SLS and the proposed Shapley value based 2-
SLS indicate that neither data nor the specification in our model were responsible for the 
unexpected results provided by the conventional 2-SLS, but the problem was created by collinearity 
at the second stage of the 2-SLS. A treatment of the problem of collinearity by using the Shapley 
value regression at the second stage of 2-SLS has rendered the results that are conformal to our 
expectation based on reasoned and realistic ground. 
 
In Table-6.1 and Table-6.2 we present the correlation matrices of disturbances across the equations. 
A larger magnitude of correlation in an off-diagonal cell indicates cross correlation of residuals that 
may affect the efficiency of an equation method of estimation and prompt to seek for an application 
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of any system method of estimation. A perusal of the elements of correlation matrices reveals that 
while for DI16 the cross correlations are often very small (irrespective of the view of globalization - 
pessimistic or optimistic,  and the method of estimation - conventional or Shapley value regression 
based), this is only partially (but dominantly) true of P (the political dimension of globalization). 
However, this is not so for the economic (E1 and E2) and social (S1, S2 and S3) indicators of 
globalization in which most of the correlation coefficients are significantly large in magnitude.  
 
Table-6.1. Correlation Among Residuals At Stage-2 of Conventional and Shapley Value Based 2-SLS  
( Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization) 
Eqn 
End 
Var 
Conventional 2-SLS  Shapley Value based 2-SLS 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16  E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 
1 E1 1.000 0.387 0.575 0.560 0.280 -0.186 0.066  1.000 0.354 0.564 0.551 0.274 -0.180 0.008 
2 E2 0.387 1.000 0.517 0.563 0.472 -0.021 0.072  0.354 1.000 0.458 0.509 0.479 -0.050 0.073 
3 S1 0.575 0.517 1.000 0.660 0.466 -0.199 0.038  0.564 0.458 1.000 0.669 0.456 -0.189 -0.041 
4 S2 0.560 0.563 0.660 1.000 0.543 0.098 -0.056  0.551 0.509 0.669 1.000 0.529 0.103 -0.087 
5 S3 0.280 0.472 0.466 0.543 1.000 0.390 -0.047  0.274 0.479 0.456 0.529 1.000 0.359 -0.102 
6 P -0.186 -0.021 -0.199 0.098 0.390 1.000 0.078  -0.180 -0.050 -0.189 0.103 0.359 1.000 0.085 
7 DI16 0.066 0.072 0.038 -0.056 -0.047 0.078 1.000  0.008 0.073 -0.041 -0.087 -0.102 0.085 1.000 
. 
Table-6.1. Correlation Among Residuals At Stage-2 of Conventional and Shapley Value Based 2-SLS  
(Optimistic Scenario of Globalization) 
Eqn 
End 
Var 
Conventional 2-SLS  Shapley Value based 2-SLS 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16  E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI16 
1 E1 1.000 0.347 0.553 0.509 0.205 -0.224 0.139  1.000 0.315 0.526 0.494 0.187 -0.204 0.097 
2 E2 0.347 1.000 0.528 0.599 0.479 -0.016 0.071  0.315 1.000 0.476 0.556 0.475 -0.048 0.093 
3 S1 0.553 0.528 1.000 0.696 0.512 -0.141 0.004  0.526 0.476 1.000 0.704 0.509 -0.130 -0.081 
4 S2 0.509 0.599 0.696 1.000 0.586 0.107 -0.005  0.494 0.556 0.704 1.000 0.582 0.111 -0.068 
5 S3 0.205 0.479 0.512 0.586 1.000 0.319 -0.053  0.187 0.475 0.509 0.582 1.000 0.297 -0.077 
6 P -0.224 -0.016 -0.141 0.107 0.319 1.000 0.134  -0.204 -0.048 -0.130 0.111 0.297 1.000 0.066 
7 DI16 0.139 0.071 0.004 -0.005 -0.053 0.134 1.000  0.097 0.093 -0.081 -0.068 -0.077 0.066 1.000 
. 
Table-7. Difference between Correlation Among Residuals of Conventional versus Shapley Value Based 2-SLS  
Eqn 
End 
Var 
Pessimistic Scenario of Globalization  Optimistic Scenario of Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI  E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P DI 
1 E1 0 0.033 0.011 0.009 0.006 -0.006 0.058  0 0.032 0.027 0.015 0.018 -0.02 0.042 
2 E2 0.033 0 0.059 0.054 -0.007 0.029 -0.001  0.032 0 0.052 0.043 0.004 0.032 -0.022 
3 S1 0.011 0.059 0 -0.009 0.01 -0.01 0.079  0.027 0.052 0 -0.008 0.003 -0.011 0.085 
4 S2 0.009 0.054 -0.009 0 0.014 -0.005 0.031  0.015 0.043 -0.008 0 0.004 -0.004 0.063 
5 S3 0.006 -0.007 0.01 0.014 0 0.031 0.055  0.018 0.004 0.003 0.004 0 0.022 0.024 
6 P -0.006 0.029 -0.01 -0.005 0.031 0 -0.007  -0.02 0.032 -0.011 -0.004 0.022 0 0.068 
7 DI 0.058 -0.001 0.079 0.031 0.055 -0.007 0  0.042 -0.022 0.085 0.063 0.024 0.068 0 
 
In Table-7 we present the difference between the cross-equation correlation coefficients obtained 
by the conventional and the Shapley value based 2-SLS. This is for both views of globalization, 
pessimistic and optimistic. A positive value in the off-diagonal cell indicates that the cross-equation 
correlation of disturbances obtained by the conventional 2-SLS is stronger than the one obtained by 
the Shapley value regression based 2-SLS (while the negative value conveys the opposite). For the 
pessimistic view of globalization, in the upper diagonal cells of the difference matrix 21 (=7x(7-1)/2) 
elements are there. Out of them only 7 are negative. It conveys that in two-third of cases the 
Shapley value based 2-SLS may be more efficient than the conventional 2-SLS. For the optimistic 
view of globalization, there are only 5 negative values in the upper diagonal cells of the difference 
matrix. It conveys that in (a little over) three-fourth of cases, the Shapley value based 2-SLS may be 
more efficient than the conventional 2-SLS. This also is one of the reasons why we consider that the 
Shapley value based 2-SLS has given better results than the conventional 2-SLS. 
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7. Concluding Remarks: On the basis of our analysis that models the relationship between 
democracy and globalization in a simultaneous equations framework, we conclude the following: (1). 
Overall, democracy and globalization promote each other and hence there is a bi-directional 
causality with positive relationships running both ways between democracy and globalization as 
envisaged by Eichengreen and Leblang (2006). At a national level, there may be various intermediary 
conditions (such as institutional and historical factors, relative factor abundance, demographic 
reasons, influence and the self-interests of the elite class, safety nets for stability and building 
political support by the national government, etc.) that modify the relationship as well as set in 
motion a complex of positive and/or negative feedbacks to accelerate or retard the pace of 
globalization and democratization  in a country-specific manner. However, when a large number of 
countries are studied a clear relationship emerges out. (2). There is a need to estimate the structural 
coefficients of the model cautiously since the regression equations may be suffering from 
collinearity among the predictor variables. The Shapley value regression based 2-SLS has performed 
better than the conventional regression in estimating the structural parameters of the model.  (3). It 
is expected that the system methods of estimation of the model would give better results than what 
are obtained by the single equation methods of estimation of structural parameters of the model.   
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